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THE IMPACT OF CONSOLIDATED MULTIDISTRICT
PROCEEDINGS ON PLAINTIFFS IN
MASS-DISASTER LITIGATION
JOHN W. BEATTY*

N THE EARLY 1960's the federal district courts were on the
brink of drowning in a sea of treble damage civil anti-trust
actions that had been filed throughout the country following criminal convictions of various electrical equipment manufacturers
Congress came to the rescue in 1968 by enacting section 1407 of
Title 28 which, in general, provides a mechanism, the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, for consolidating similar litigation
that is pending in various and diverse district courts for coordinated
pretrial proceedings.' Since its creation, the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation has dealt with almost one hundred multidistrict proceedings and has consolidated most of them.' Of these
proceedings, twenty-two have been "mass-disaster" cases, and all but
two of those have arisen out of airplane accidents." The first of the
* B. Ch. E., Villanova University; J.D., University of Notre Dame; Attorney at
Law, Cincinnati, Ohio. Mr. Beatty participated in the litigation in the consolidated proceedings involving the air crash at the Greater Cincinnati Airport in
November, 1967, and is participating counsel in the consolidated multidistrict proceedings arising out of the mid-air collision near Fairland, Indiana in September
1969.
' See 2 U.S. CONG. & ADM. NEWS 1898 (1968) for a partial legislative history
of 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970).
228 U.S.C. S 1407 (1970).
3One of the most recent reported opinions of the Multidistrict Panel bears
docket No. 93. See In re Motion Picture 'Standard Accessories' and Antitrust
Litigation, 339 F. Supp. 1278 (J.P.M.L. 1972).
'In re Air Crash Disaster at Cincinnati Airport, 295 F. Supp. 51 (J.P.M.L.
1968); In re Air Crash Disaster at Cincinnati Airport, 298 F. Supp. 353 (J.P.M.L.
1968), 298 F. Supp. 355, 358 (J.P.M.L. 1969); In re Air Crash Disaster at Ardmore, Oklahoma, 295 F. Supp. 45 (J.P.M.L. 1968); In re Mid-Air COllision Near
Hendersonville, North Carolina, 297 F. Supp. 1039 (J.P.M.L. 1969); In re Air
Disaster at Hong Kong, 298 F. Supp. 390 (J.P.M.L. 1969); In re Air Crash at
Falls City, Nebraska, 298 F. Supp. 1323 (J.P.M.L. 1969); In re Mid-Air Collision
Near Fairland, Indiana, 309 F. Supp. 621 (J.P.M.L. 1970); In re Air Crash Dis-
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air disasters to be considered by the Multidistrict Panel under sec-

tion 1407 was the crash of a Trans World Airlines jetliner on
November 20, 1967, during an attempted landing at the Greater
Cincinnati Airport in which seventy-two persons died.' Consolidation was ordered in October, 1968.' Thus, several of the "multidistricted" air disaster cases have now matured sufficiently to reach
some reasonably reliable conclusions with respect to how well this
radically new procedure works in actual practice. It is the purpose
of this article to discuss, on the basis of the author's personal

observations, the practical effect and impact of consolidated multidistrict proceedings in mass-disaster litigation from the plaintiff's
viewpoint.
While the prime beneficiary of section 1407 is the federal judiciary, the defendants also benefit. Were it not for the protection the

defendants receive from the consolidation of all pretrial proceedings, they would be subject to intolerably burdensome, duplicative
and conflicting discovery in every district where any actions were
filed. For the plaintiffs, on the other hand, multidistrict consolidation
is a mixed blessing. By creating enormous practical and logistical

problems that are not commonly encountered in ordinary civil
litigation, it is not at all clear that the benefits of consolidation to
plaintiffs outweigh or even equal the attendant problems.!
aster at Santa Monica Bay, California, Docket No. 34 (J.P.M.L. 1970); In re
Air Crash Disaster Near Dayton, Ohio, 310 F. Supp. 798 (J.P.M.L. 1970); In re
Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover, New Hampshire, 314 F. Supp. 62 (J.P.M.L.
1970); In re San Juan, Puerto Rico Air Crash Disaster, 316 F. Supp. 981
(J.P.M.L. 1970); In re Air Crash Disaster at San Antonio, Venezuela, 331 F.
Supp. 547 (J.P.M.L. 1971); In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, Louisiana,
331 F. Supp. 554 (J.P.M.L. 1971); In re Air Crash Disaster at Las Vegas, Nevada, 336 F. Supp. 414 (J.P.M.L. 1972); In re Air Crash Disaster at Denver,
Colorado, Docket No. 88 (J.P.M.L. 1972); In re Air Crash Disaster at Bradford,
Penn., Docket No. M.D.L.-42A (J.P.M.L.); In re Air Crash Disaster at Bradford, Penn., Docket No. M.D.L.-42B (J.P.M.L.); In re Air Crash Disaster at
Maracaibo, Venezuela, Docket No. M.D.L.-48 (J.P.M.L.); In re Air Crash Disaster at Mandeville, La., Docket No. M.D.L.-84 (J.P.M.L.); In re Air Crash
Disaster at Huntington, W.Va., Docket No. M.D.L.-94 (J.P.M.L.); In re Air
Crash Disaster at Anchorage, Alaska, Docket No. M.D.L.-95 (J.P.M.L.); In re
Air Crash Disaster at Tweed-New Haven Airport, Docket No. M.D.L.-96
(J.P.M.L.).
5In re Air Crash Disaster at Cincinnati Airport, Docket No. 8B, Jud. Pan.
Mult. Lit. Opinion and Order dated October 21, 1968, 298 F. Supp. 353 (J.P.M.L.
1968). This author's law firm was selected to act as lead counsel for all plaintiffs
in the consolidated multi-district proceedings.
61d.
7 See, e.g., McElhaney, A Plea for the Preservation of the "Worm's Eye View"
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I. A

HYPOTHETICAL CASE HISTORY

To best focus on the problems of multidistrict litigation, a hypothetical is presented that will prove to be a fairly typical case history. In early January, 1970, a scheduled commercial flight leaves
Dallas, Texas and crashes in Iowa with a loss of eighty lives. One
of the passengers was an average middle-aged gentleman from
Dallas whose surviving widow retains a Dallas attorney to represent the estate. In March the attorney files suit against the airline
in the state court, planning to proceed expeditiously with the
minimum of discovery, perhaps intending to rely heavily on the
published results of the National Transportation Safety Board's
investigation. The plaintiff's attorney reasons that since the airline,
as a common carrier, owed the decedent the highest degree of care,
a res ipsa loquitur theory might even be used to establish liability.
The defendant airline immediately removes the case to the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Undaunted,
plaintiff's counsel serves interrogatories and requests for production
on the airline, but instead of responding, the airline files a motion
to have the court stay all discovery on the basis that this case will
soon be consolidated for coordinated pretrial proceedings with all
other similar cases. The motion is granted and plaintiff's attorney
is temporarily stymied.
Perhaps a month passes before the plaintiff's attorney receives
notice that a hearing is to be held in Washington, D.C. before the
Federal Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to decide whether
these cases (many of which have by then been filed in various
districts throughout the country) should be consolidated, and if
so, in which district. The hearing date is set for June, a month
later. Since the decedent's estate is modest the attorney advances
the costs and flies to Washington for the hearing. It is not until
July that the plaintiff's attorney receives the Panel's order directing
that all cases arising out of the crash be transferred to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.'
Following the transfer order the various district courts where
actions are pending begin forwarding their entire case files to Iowa,
in Multidistrict Litigation, 37 J. AIR LAW & COM. 49, 51 (1971).

' 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1970) provides in part: "When civil actions involving
one or more common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated pretrial proceedings."
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and in August the transferee district court sends notices to all
parties that the first general pretrial conference will be held in
September. Again, the Dallas attorney advances costs and flies to
Iowa for the hearing. He finds that the expertise of participating
counsel varies considerably-from those who have never practiced in federal courts to representatives of law firms specializing
in aviation litigation. In addition, the magnitude of the interests of
the various attorneys differs markedly; some having cases with
relatively insignificant judgment value, while others may represent
as many as eight, ten or even fifteen decedent's estates and thus
have an enormous stake in the proceedings.
At the hearing, which has a pervasive undercurrent of confusion
created by the large number of counsel and parties combined with
the diversity and inconsistency of their opinions on how the proceedings should be managed, the court eventually establishes a
few ground rules and sets time limits for some preliminary matters
such as filing of answers, cross-claims, third-party complaints and
answers as needed. These matters become complicated by disputes
over jurisdiction and venue between some, but not, all of the parties
or related to certain specific cases. Time limits are set for filing
and briefing various motions. The court also sets some tentative
target dates for the opening salvo of the discovery processes including identification of documentary materials to be produced by
each of the various defendants.! Ultimately, the court, in attempting
to adhere to the pattern suggested by the Manual for Complex and
Multidistrict Litigation, asks the plaintiffs' counsel as a group to
select one or more of their number to act as "liaison" counsel."
The Manual suggests this position but unfortunately does not
undertake to define specifically the functions, powers or responsibilities of "liaison" counsel. It is at this point that those attorneys
having the greatest financial interest in the outcome assert their
legitimate claim to a prominent or controlling role in the conduct
' This hypothetical sequence of events closely parallels the procedure suggested

for the first principal pretrial conference in the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION § 1.0 (1970). [hereinafter cited as MANUAL].

AND

'0 MANUAL 5 1.9. This section caveats against "appointing liaison counsel over
the objection of one or more parties." Where there are conflicting interests or
theories, provision is also made for appointment of more than one liaison counsel. Section 1.9 further provides: "The court should not compel a party to authorize other than his own to make admissions by stipulations in matters of substance."
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of all future pretrial proceedings. Unfortunately, the court does not
undertake to issue any orders concerning the obligations of all
plaintiffs' counsel to share in the costs of pretrial discovery; nor
does the court establish any basis for payment of fees to compensate lead counsel in the discharge of the somewhat ambiguous
duties that devolve upon him in the capacity of "liaison" counsel.
Moreover there are not any agreements or contracts entered into by
the various plaintiffs' counsel to provide for the sharing of costs or
compensation of those attorneys who take the lead for the benefit
of all in the conduct of discovery.
At the close of the hearing our attorney returns to Dallas without any clear understanding of how, when or by whom the pretrial
discovery will be conducted on behalf of plaintiffs, or whether or
how those attorneys who take the laboring oar will be reimbursed
for costs or compensated for their efforts on behalf of all. It is
clear by this time, however, that those few attorneys who have
surfaced as "liaison" or lead counsel have in mind extremely
lengthy and detailed discovery that will inevitably involve dozens
of depositions and the production of many thousands of documents
and exhibits all of which will inevitably take at least a year to complete and will primarily occur in Iowa. And since the court has
allowed three months for tidying-up the pleadings and disposing of
various preliminary motions, the first stages of discovery will not
begin until January 1971, at the earliest; i.e., one year after the
accident and nine months after our Dallas attorney first attempted
to begin discovery himself.
Within a few months after the first pretrial hearing, the flow of
information from Iowa has been reduced to a sporadic and undependable trickle. The Dallas attorney gradually becomes aware
that discovery is underway and is being conducted to a great extent,
by agreement between the various defense counsel and a few plaintiffs' attorneys who have become de facto lead counsel, and without
formal advance notices. Inquiries to the actively participating
counsel bring only half-hearted replies suggesting that if he were
genuinely interested, he too could keep abreast by coming to Iowa
for the next few months and participating himself. But the Dallas
attorney concludes that this is a practical and economical impossibility; a conclusion that will be shared by most other plaintiffs'
attorneys scattered throughout the nation. His modest case simply
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would not justify so great an investment of his time and money.
He briefly considers referring the case to an attorney in Iowa, but
soon rejects that idea when he remembers that section 1407 provides that the case will be remanded to the Dallas district court
for trial upon completion of pretrial proceedings.1" Thus, our attorney finally reconciles himself to the fact that he is unable as a
practical matter, either to participate in or remain abreast of discovery. He consoles himself, however, with the hope that at the
termination of pretrial proceedings a complete discovery "package"
will be available to him to prepare for trial. He will eventually discover that these expectations go largely unfulfilled.
These problems appear vastly different in the eyes of plaintiffs'
"liaison" counsel. He has assumed a prominent and active role in
the discovery proceedings because he has "the big case" or a great
many cases and thus, the largest stake in the outcome. It soon
becomes obvious, however, that gradually there are fewer plaintiffs' attorneys constructively participating in pretrial discovery
until "liaison" counsel eventually finds himself carrying the entire
burden alone. Some, like the Dallas attorney, find it impossible as
a practical matter to participate, while others seem quite content
to "ride coat-tails." In any event, the "liaison" counsel by this
metamorphosis has become, de facto, a lead counsel.
"Liaison" counsel begins discovery without benefit of any order
or rule defining specifically his rights or duties and without the
comfort of any order or agreement covering sharing of costs or
compensation. For this reason he does not feel bound by any
particular obligation to other counsel and thus, he pursues his own
discovery primarily for his own benefit and without particular
concern for the interests or needs of other parties. Costs of pretrial
discovery in a complicated air crash case can easily multiply into
tens of thousands of dollars. In the absence of some voluntary
agreement to share these expenses the lead counsel must bear the
considerable burden of having to pay such large sums himself.
Inevitably, not all pretrial discovery is made a part of the formal
record. While transcripts of depositions and answers to interrogatories generally will be filed and become available to all parties,
other forms of discovery are not as available. For example, lead
counsel may reproduce, for his own files, documents that are pro1128

U.S.C. § 1407(a)

(1970).
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duced for examination by various defendants as well as photographs, analyses and reports from expert consultants he may have
retained and yet not file these items for the record. Much of this
material may never become available to non-participating attorneys
who, at this point, are somewhat on their own.
In due course all pretrial discovery is completed and the district
court at Iowa remands all of the cases to the courts where they
were originally filed and no further discovery is permitted. 2 As
part of the remand procedure the district court duplicates and forwards to each of the transferor courts a complete copy of its docket
and file, one set of which is sent to the district court in Dallas."8
But when our attorney in Dallas examines these materials he discovers to his dismay that far from being the complete discovery
package that he expected, some of the most important information
is lacking; although it may be in the possession of "liaison" counsel, it is not in the record as filed. At this point his position has
become thoroughly untenable. Discovery has been completed and
there is no longer any way for him to supply the missing links. His
settlement posture is impaired because the defendants are undoubtedly aware of his predictament. The imperfect record may
even prejudice his ability to litigate his case adequately. In light of
these circumstances the Dallas attorney may quite logically conclude that he has been left with no practical alternative other than
refer his case to the "liaison" counsel for trial. In the meantime, an
even more serious problem will have developed if prior to completion of discovery the defendants have settled with lead counsel.
If no other plaintiffs' counsel have been actively participating
and if the time limits set by the court for completion of discovery
are running out, the plaintiffs as a group may well have been dealt
a severe blow since it may be too late as a practical matter for
another attorney who is not intimately familiar with the proceedings to continue with the case.
II.

PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR SHORTCOMINGS IN MULTIDISTRICT
PROCEDURES

The foregoing scenario should not be considered merely a parade
12 Id.

"See Rule 16(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 1 CCH Av. LAW REP. § 3870 (1972).
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of horribles. Rather, it is based on actual experience in various
multidistrict proceedings to date and is the probable, if not inevitable, result of the procedures as presently designed. Obviously,
multidistrict consolidation will benefit some plaintiffs' attorneys.
Those who would in the ordinary course file immediately before
the running of a statute of limitations and who would not in any
event conduct vigorous or diligent discovery will receive the benefit
of thorough discovery done by others at a fraction of what it would
otherwise cost. On the other hand, plaintiffs' counsel who would,
if left to their own devices, pursue their cases carefully and expeditiously will find that multidistrict litigation under the existing
rules can severely hamper their ability to adequately represent their
clients and to obtain proper and adequate settlements or judgments.
Moreover, the diligent counsel will find that the process of multidistrict consolidation unavoidably results in a delay of six to nine
months, and in all probability longer.
Two possible remedies are suggested for these serious shortcomings in the present system:
(1) adoption of a rule by the Multidistrict Panel providing for
appointment of a "lead" rather than "liaison" counsel,
combined with a clear definition of his responsibilities and
provision for his adequate compensation; and
(2) determination of issues of liability by the transferee court
prior to remand to the transferor courts.
A. Lead vs. Liaison Counsel
Section 1.9 of the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation suggests that when there are multiple parties on one or both
sides of the case the court should urge the participants to select a
"liaison" counsel for the purpose of facilitating communication
with the court and coordinating activity of the various parties. But
the court should go further. It should require all plaintiffs' counsel
to select one, two or three from their number to act as lead counsel
whose duty it would be to take complete charge of all pretrial proceedings on behalf of all plaintiffs. Of course, any individual attorney would be entitled to attend all proceedings, but his participation, except in those issues unique to his case, would have to be
conducted through lead counsel. The order of the court should
provide for a pro-rata sharing of all costs incurred by lead counsel
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and for periodic advances by all plaintiffs to cover costs. The court
should further order that lead counsel be fairly compensated by
all other plaintiffs on the basis of a percentage of the eventual
recovery made in each and every case. It is suggested that something between two and seven per cent would be appropriate depending on the number of cases involved; the greater the number
of cases the lower the percentage. Moreover, lead counsel, except
for extraordinary circumstances, must continue in that capacity
until completion of all pretrial proceedings regardless of whether
he may have previously settled his own cases. Finally, the court
should direct that all of the fruits of lead counsel's discovery efforts
and all of his work product must be made fully available to all
plaintiffs regardless of whether it is made a part of the formal
record.
Experience since 1968 has shown that these arrangements in
consolidated air-disaster litigation are generally not made voluntarily but instead must be mandated. " But, while there is some
authority for taking these steps" and while analogies to class action
procedures can be made, 6 some courts have doubted their power7

to make this order or, at least, have been reluctant to do soY.

For this reason, an appropriate modification to the Manual for
Complex and Multidistrict Litigation is required.
Adoption of this procedure would prevent most of the described
problems from occurring. Non-lead counsel would no longer be in
jeopardy of being prejudiced by an incomplete "discovery package." In addition, the problem of defendants eliminating lead counsel by settling his cases to gain a tactical advantage over other
plaintiffs would be obviated. Continuity of discovery as well as
adequate flow of information to all counsel would also be assured.
Finally, lead counsel would be fairly compensated for the benefit
which others derive from his efforts and would be relieved of the
considerable burden of financing the entire proceedings himself.
' 4 See, e.g., Reidinger v. TWA, 329 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Ky. 1971), and all
related cases; Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., Civil No. IP. 69-C-143 (S.D.
Ind. 1971), and all related cases.
"See, e.g., Rando v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., Inc., 25 F.R.D. 483
(E.D.N.Y. 1960) where the court acted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) because defendant moved for appointment of not more than three counsel to supervise
pretrial proceedings.

16FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
"See

note 14 supra.
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B. Determination of Liability by Transferee Court
Even though these recommended procedures might be beneficial,
there is still another problem that is inherent in the nature of the
consolidated multidistrict proceedings. The attorneys who cannot
or do not choose to participate lose out on the educational benefit
that flows from direct involvement in the discovery process. Even
under ideal circumstances it is difficult to make effective use of
another attorney's voluminous record in an extremely complicated
and highly technical case without direct participation in the preparation of the discovery. At the close of pretrial proceedings typically there will be few attorneys, other than lead counsel, with sufficient in-depth understanding of the case to be able to try the
liability issues adequately.
The existence of only a few well-informed attorneys would
suggest the desirability of a consolidated trial on liability in the
transferee court. Not only would non-participating plaintiffs' counsel benefit from a consolidated liability trial, but there would also
be a considerable savings in judicial time and effort that otherwise
might be required for duplicative and repetitive lengthy trials in the
various transferor courts. In addition, a determination of liability
by the transferee court applicable to all cases would relieve defendants of the burden of exposure to multiple trials with the attendant risk of inconsistent judgments. The question then becomes
whether the transferee court has any jurisdiction to conduct a trial
on the merits of the pending cases or to decide the issues of liability
in those cases.
There are three ways in which a transferee court can litigate or
dispose of liability issues in consolidated multidistrict proceedings.
1. Change of Venue for all Purposes
Section 1407(a) states:
Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or
before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district
from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously
terminated ....
This language is mandatory and suggests that the only situation in
which a case would not be remanded to the transferor court at the
conclusion of pretrial proceedings is when it has been "previously
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terminated." Obviously the statute does not contemplate a trial on
the merits in the transferee court. There is, however, some recent
and limited authority holding that the transferee court has the
power, pursuant to section 1404 (a)," to transfer the cases pending
before it for pretrial proceedings to itself for all purposes including trial." Section 1404(a) permits change of venue "for the
convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice."
Rule 15(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Multidistrict Panel
also suggests the existence of this power in the transferee court."
This procedure may not, however, be appropriate or desirable in
every situation. First, a transfer via section 1404(a) is a change of
venue for all purposes; plaintiffs would be required to litigate not
only liability issues but also damages in the transferee forum,
which they may be unwilling to do. Further, a transfer under section 1404(a) can only be made to a district where the action
"might have been brought" originally. 1 This requirement will
normally not present any particular problems with respect to actions
against the United States" or against commercial airlines in view
of the liberality of long-arm statutes in most states.2 3 It may, hows28

U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970).

I.Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'g In re Antibiotic
Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 326 F. Supp. 121 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
" Rule 15(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, 1 CCH Av. LAw REP. § 3870 (1972) states in part: "In the absence

of unusual circumstances, actions terminated in the transferee court by settlement,
dismissal or summary judgment shall not be remanded by the Panel and shall
be dismissed by the transferee court."
In a recent amendment to these rules, to be effective March 30, 1972, Rule

15(e) now states in part: "Each transferred action that has not been terminated
in the transferee court will be remanded to the transferor district for trial, unless
ordered transferred by the transferee judge to the transferee or other district under 28 U.S.C. S 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406."
2128 U.S.C. 5 1404(a) (1970) reads as follows: "For the convenience of

parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any
civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."
22 28 U.S.C. S 1404 (1970).
23Typical long-arm statutes in force in many states allow for extra-territorial
service of process and jurisdiction over nonresidents wherever tortious injury is
caused in that state by any act or omission outside the state or where tortious injury is caused anywhere by an act or omission done within that state. See, e.g.,

Ouio REv. CODE § 2307.382 (1970). Thus, the situs of the crash of an airliner
will generally involve the causing of a tortious injury or commission of an act
that results in injury within the state where the crash occurred. It thus becomes

possible to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident airline in the state where the

crash occurred.
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ever, present an obstacle to transfer when there are other defendants who might not be subject to the jurisdiction of the transferee
court.
2. Summary Judgment in Transferee Court
A second method of litigating liability issues in the transferee
court is through summary judgment. The usefulness of this procedure is limited in complex cases since rarely will there be a complete absence of genuine issues of material fact in the record at
the completion of discovery." It is certainly conceivable though
that under appropriate circumstances some of the parties might be
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
There would seem to be little question of the jurisdiction of the
transferee court to grant summary judgments in appropriate situations. A number of courts have indicated that this power does
exist" and several others have granted summary judgments in
multidistrict consolidation proceedings." The legislative history
of section 1407 suggests that the phrase "pretrial proceedings" as
used in section 1407 contemplates summary judgments. Finally
the rules of the Multidistrict Panel permit this remedy to be granted
by the transferee court even though it is a disposition on the
merits."
3. Trial of a Test Case and Collateral Estoppel
The third method in which a transferee court can effectively
dispose of all issues of liability is to set an early trial on one of the
cases over which it has original jurisdiction; that case would then
become a "test case." A final determination of liability in that
action could then be directly used as a basis for partial summary
judgments on liability by plaintiffs in those states that have adopted
I FED.

R. Civ. P. 56(c).
'In re Alsco-Harvard Fraud Litigation, 325 F. Supp. 315 (J.P.M.L. 1971);
In re Butterfield Patent Infringement, 328 F. Supp. 513 (J.P.M.L. 1970); In re

Fourth Class Postage Regulations, 298 F. Supp. 1326 (J.P.M.L. 1968); In re
Plumbing Fixtures Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484 (J.P.M.L. 1968).
2
See Reidinger v. TWA, 329 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Ky. 1971) but reversed by
the Sixth Circuit on July 6, 1972 (Civil Nos. 71-1721 through 71-1735) upon a
finding that genuine issues of material fact existed in the record; Multidistrict Civil

Actions Involving the Air Crash Near Dayton, Ohio on March 9, 1967, Supp. -, 12 Av. Cas. 17,229 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
27 See note 1 supra, at 1900.
28
See note 20 supra.

F.
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the rule of third-party collateral estoppel." But even if that doctrine is unavailable, a simple determination of liability is generally
conclusive as a practical matter since rarely has more than one
case ever been tried from a single air-disaster.
III. CONCLUSION

Multidistrict consolidation is of great benefit both to the federal
judiciary and to defendants and is obviously here to stay in massdisaster cases. But the present procedures as set forth in the Manual
for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation have been conceived with
little appreciation of their practical impact on plaintiffs. Transfer
creates economic and logistic problems that render it virtually impossible for the typical plaintiff's counsel to participate in the
pretrial proceedings; and since pretrial proceedings are almost
invariably the only proceedings in these situations (full trials being
a rarity) transfer can seriously impair the attorneys' ability to
provide effective representation of his client. Further, those attorneys who take the lead should, in fairness, be compensated.
There is no justification for assuming that they should be willing
to subsidize other plaintiffs either in terms of payment of costs or
investment of their own time and talents. Plaintiffs' attorneys must
be protected from the untimely departure of lead counsel and must
be assured that, having been effectively precluded from participating personally, they will not be prejudiced by an incomplete
discovery package.
Finally, the transferee court should, when possible, determine
the basic liability issues before remand; always keeping in mind,
however, the great deference that should be accorded to plaintiffs'
original choice of forum and their legitimate interest in having
damage issues litigated in a forum convenient to them.

"See

generally 1B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

(2d ed. 1971).

5

0.412.1, at 1805, et seq.

